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Abstract 
This paper studies theoretically how the cross-country differences in the institutional quality 
(IQ) of the domestic credit markets shape the patterns of international capital flows when 
such IQ differences cause productivity differences across countries. IQ affects productivity by 
changing productivity-agency cost trade-offs across heterogeneous investment projects, 
which have opposite effects on the investment and capital flows from exogenous productivity 
differences. The overall effect of IQ could generate U-shaped responses of the investment 
and capital flows. This means that capital could flow from middle-income to low-income and 
high-income countries; and starting from a low IQ, a country could experience both growth 
and a current account surplus after an institutional reform. More generally, the results here 
offer some cautions when interpreting the evidence on the role of productivity and 
institutional differences on capital flows and question the validity of using financial frictions as 
a proxy for the quality of financial institutions. 
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1. Introduction 
 It is now well established that capital often flows “upstream,” i.e., from 
poor to rich countries, contrary to the prediction of the standard textbook 
neoclassical model.1  To explain such reverse flows, one needs to abandon the 
central tenet of the neoclassical paradigm; rich countries are rich only because they 
have high capital/labor ratios.  In reality, of course, countries differ in many 
dimensions.  For example, some countries may be richer because they use more 
productive technologies.  Then, capital would flow upstream, because the lenders 
would get higher return in the rich countries.  Or, some countries may be richer 
due to their superior credit market institutions.  Then capital would flow upstream, 
because rich countries do better jobs protecting the interest of lenders.  Indeed, a 
simple theoretical model can be used to show how exogenous cross-country 
variations in productivity or in institutional quality can generate reverse capital 
flows (as will be demonstrated in Section 3).  One might think intuitively that this 
logic should carry over even if productivity differences are caused by institutional 
quality differences.2  This paper aims to show theoretically that productivity 
differences that arise endogenously due to institutional differences have effects on 
capital flows that are opposite of exogenous productivity differences, and that 
institutional differences might have non-monotonic effects on capital flows through 
their effects on productivity. 3 
 In the model presented below, countries differ in the institutional quality 
(IQ) of their domestic credit markets.  Saving flows freely across countries, 
equalizing the rate of return.4  In each country, entrepreneurs have access to a 
variety of heterogeneous investment projects with productivity-agency cost trade-
off: a more productive project comes with a bigger agency cost.  As entrepreneurs 
compete for funding, credit goes to the projects that generate the highest return to 
the lenders (net of agency cost), which are not the most productive ones.  The key 
feature of the model is that the agency cost of each project depends not only on the 
nature of each project, but also on the country’s IQ.  More productive projects are 
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more affected by the country’s IQ, due to their bigger agency problems.  In this 
setup, IQ differences can cause productivity differences, because IQ affects the 
productivity-agency cost trade-off, hence the types of projects financed in each 
country.  And it is shown, perhaps counter-intuitively, that such an institution-
induced productivity improvement, though it leads to a higher output and a higher 
wage just like an exogenous one, leads to a lower investment and a current account 
surplus (i.e., capital outflow), unlike an exogenous one.  
 Why do investment and capital flows respond differently to institution-
induced productivity changes?  Let me try to offer verbally an intuition to this 
rather counterintuitive result.  (Later, this will be shown more formally, which is 
precisely one of the main goals of the model.)  Although it is often overlooked, 
higher productivity generally has two effects that work in the opposite directions.  
The first effect is that more output can be produced with less investment.  The 
second effect is that a higher rate of return makes the lender willing to finance 
more investment.  In the exogenous case, both effects operate.  However, under 
the relatively mild assumption, satisfied for example when the production function 
is Cobb-Douglas, the second effect dominates the first, which means that higher 
productivity leads to a higher investment, and hence to a current account deficit 
(i.e., capital inflow).   In contrast, when productivity rises in response to a better 
IQ in our model, it is because the composition of credit shifts toward more 
productive projects, which come with bigger agency problems.  This offsets any 
effect on the rate of return to the lender (i.e., net of the agency cost) that the 
resulting productivity improvement might have.5  This means that the first effect 
dominates the second, hence a lower investment and a current account surplus 
(i.e., capital outflow). 
 Note also that this makes an overall effect of IQ on capital flows generally 
ambiguous, because two effects work in the opposite directions.  First, holding 
productivity constant, a better IQ causes to a current account deficit (i.e., capital 
inflow), because it makes the country a more attractive place to invest.  Second, 
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induced productivity improvement causes a current account surplus (i.e., capital 
outflow), because the country needs less investments to produce more output.  
This means that, even if the rich are more productive and have better IQ than the 
poor, there is no reason to expect large capital flows in either direction.  Or the 
lack of such capital flows should not be interpreted as the prima facie evidence for 
the presence of significant barriers for international capital flows. 
 Some parametric examples also suggest that improving IQ, while 
monotonically increasing the capital stock and wages, leads initially to a lower 
investment and a current account surplus (i.e., capital outflow)  and then to a 
higher investment and a current account deficit, (i.e., capital inflow).  Such an U-
shaped response of capital flows to IQ implies that, if countries inherently differ 
only in IQ, middle-income countries run a current account surplus (i.e., capital 
outflow), while high-income and low-income countries run a current account 
deficit (i.e., capital inflow).  However, these countries experience capital inflows 
for different reasons.  High-income countries experiences inflows because they do 
better jobs protecting the interest of lenders, while low-income countries 
experiences inflows because they make less efficient use of the investment.6  It also 
suggests that, starting from very low IQ, an institutional reform would help low-
income countries to experience both a growth and a current account surplus at the 
same time.   
 Even when the indirect effect of IQ through productivity is not 
quantitatively large enough to offset its direct effect, hence unable to generate non-
monotonic effects, the prediction that institution-induced productivity differences 
have the effects on the patterns of capital flows opposite from productivity 
differences due to other factors should provide some cautions when interpreting 
the empirical evidence.  For example, imagine that the rich countries are more 
productive partly due to their better IQ and partly due to other mechanisms, such 
as human capital externalities suggested by Lucas (1990) and others.   Then, one’s 
failure to properly separate the two sources of productivity differences could lead 
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one to overestimate the effects on capital flows of IQ differences and to 
underestimate those of productivity differences due to human capital externalities.   
 More generally, the results here call into question the usefulness of the 
standard dichotomy, “productivity differences” versus “credit market 
imperfections,” often used in the literature on international capital flows.7  
Furthermore, the model suggests the need for separating the quality of financial 
institutions, which is an exogenous characteristic of countries, and the degree of 
financial frictions, which is endogenously determined as it depends on the 
equilibrium composition of credit, although the two are interpreted 
interchangeably, with the latter being often used as a proxy of the former, in the 
literature.  The results here suggest that doing so might be highly misleading. 
 Many theoretical studies have already examined the effects of domestic 
credit market imperfections on international capital flows.8  In models of Gertler 
and Rogoff (1990) and Matsuyama (2004; 2005, sec. 2), countries do not differ in 
their institutional quality, but the presence of credit market imperfections give 
advantage to those entrepreneurs with higher net worth when competing for credit 
in the world market, which could cause reverse capital flows.   In models of 
Sakuragawa and Hamada (2001), Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008), 
Matsuyama (2008, sec.6) and Ju and Wei (2010), among others, reverse flows 
occur because countries differ in their IQ, but productivity does not respond to the 
IQ.9  Productivity responds endogenously through a change in the composition of 
credit across projects with different productivity in the closed economy dynamic 
macro model of Matsuyama (2007), but the reason why the composition changes is 
due to an endogenous movement of borrower net worth over time, not due to a 
change in IQ.  In the trade literature, Beck (2002), Matsuyama (2005, sec.3), and 
many others (see Matsuyama (2008, sec.7) for the reference), show that cross-
country differences in IQ affects the patterns of trade by changing the composition 
of credit across sectors, with countries with higher IQ exporting in sectors with 
bigger agency problems.  Among these studies, Antras and Caballero (2009) shows 
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how such an institution-induced change in the patterns of trade could interact with 
the patterns of capital flows, but they are mainly interested in the question of 
whether trade and capital flows are complements or substitutes.10 
 The non-monotonic patterns of capital flows implied by the U-shaped 
response to IQ, i.e., current account surpluses of the middle-income countries 
finance current account deficits of the low- and high- income countries, might be 
somewhat reminiscent of the empirical finding by Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007), 
who called it the “allocation puzzle.”  It should be noted, however, that the goal of 
this paper is not to offer a solution to the allocation puzzle.  Rather, it is to clarify 
a mechanism (previously unknown, to the best of my knowledge), through which 
the quality of domestic financial markets affects productivity, the aggregate 
investment, and the patterns of capital flows. 11   To this end, the model developed 
below deliberately abstracts from many other factors that affect the patterns of 
capital flows.  In particular, the model is set up in such a way that the aggregate 
saving does not respond to changes in IQ nor in productivity.  In this respect, the 
recent studies by Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2011) and Buera and Shin 
(2010) are noteworthy.  Partly motivated by the allocation puzzle, they have 
shown that, when the economy starts booming after an economic reform that 
triggers the process of reallocation from the old and less efficient to the new and 
more efficient sectors, it experiences a current account surplus (i.e., capital 
outflow) because the aggregate saving grows faster than the aggregate investment, 
under the assumption that the new and more efficient sectors are borrowing-
constrained due to the domestic credit market imperfections.  This might lead some 
to suspect that their mechanisms would be weakened, if the institutional quality of 
domestic credit markets improves as a result of the very economic reform that 
triggers the boom.  The result obtained here, however, suggests that such an 
improvement could even magnify capital outflows generated by the economic 
reform.12  In this sense, the present study is complementary to their studies.  
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 The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  After setting up the model in 
Section 2, Section 3 briefly discusses the patterns of international capital flows 
when both productivity differences and IQ differences are exogenous.  Section 4 
shows how productivity responds to IQ through its effect on the composition of 
credit and explains why such endogenous productivity differences have opposite 
implications on the investment and capital flows.  Section 5 looks at the patterns of 
international capital flows when countries inherently differ only in IQ but IQ 
differences cause productivity differences, first for the case of two projects with 
two or three countries.  Then, the analysis is extended for the case of a continuum 
of projects to show that the results are not driven by the discrete or finite nature of 
the available projects.   From Section 2 through Section 5, the model is described 
as a two-sector, two-period model for the ease of presentation.  However, the 
model can also be given a one-sector, and infinite-period interpretation, as 
explained in Section 6.  Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. The Setup; A Two-sector, Two-period Interpretation 
There are two periods: t = 0, “today” and t = 1, “future.”  (Section 6.2 
shows how this two-period setup can be reinterpreted as an infinite period model 
within an overlapping generations framework.)   In t = 0, the endowment is 
allocated between consumption in t = 0 and investment projects.  In t = 1, these 
investment projects generate capital, K, which are combined with labor, L, 
available in fixed supply, to produce the consumption good with CRS technology, 
Y = F(K, L) ≡ f(k)L, where k ≡ K/L is the capital-labor ratio and  f(k) is output per 
labor, satisfying the usual properties, )(' kf > 0 > )(" kf  and )0('f . 
 The world economy consists of a finite number of countries, indexed by c 
 C.  (For the moment, however, we suppress the country index to keep the 
notation simple.)  In each country, there are two types of agents.  First, there is a 
continuum of savers/workers with measure L, each of whom has ω units of 
endowment in t = 0 and supplies one unit of labor and earns )(kw  
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)(')( kkfkf  in t = 1.  They seek to maximize the quasi-linear preferences of the 
form: 
sss CCVU 10 )(  ,     V > 0 > V 
subject to the budget constraint, 
)()( 01 kwCrC
ss   ,  
where r is the (gross) market rate of return on their saving.  From the first-order 
condition, rCV s )(' 0 , each saver/worker consumes )()'(
1
0 rVC
s   in t = 0, so 
that their total saving is equal to: 
 LrVrS s )()'()( 1  . 
Note that the saving schedule is independent of the wage rate and hence the 
production side of the economy.13  This feature of the model helps us to focus on 
the goal of the analysis, i.e., to understand how IQ or productivity changes affect 
the investment side of capital flows, by removing the saving channel, which has 
been the primary focus of the literature; see, for example, Song, Storesletten, and 
Zilibotti (2011) and Buera and Shin (2010). 
Second, there is a continuum of borrowers/entrepreneurs with measure E, 
each of whom may be endowed with (small) ωb ≥ 0 units in t = 0.  They consume 
only in t = 1 and hence save all of ωb in t = 0.  Each entrepreneur has access to a 
set of indivisible projects, J.  A type-j ( J) project converts mj units of the 
endowment to Rjmj units of “physical capital,” by borrowing mj  ωb at the market 
rate of return, r, where mj and Rj are both fixed parameters.14  Entrepreneurs aim 
to maximize period-1 consumption.  By running a project-j, they can obtain 
)()(' bjjj mrkfmR   = 
b
jj rmrkfR  ])('[ , which is greater than or equal to 
br  (the amount obtained by lending instead of  borrowing to running any project) 
iff 
(PC-j):  rkfR j )(' , 
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where (PC-j) stands for Profitability Constraint for a Type-j.   This constraint 
implies that )(' kfR j  is the maximal rate of return that they are willing to offer to 
the lender by running a type-j project.  Furthermore, each entrepreneur has access 
to any project type-j  J.  This means that, in a world with the perfect credit 
market, competition among entrepreneurs would drive up the market rate of return 
to   )('max kfRr jJj  and only the most productive projects,  jJj RArg max , 
would be funded. 
However, the credit market is imperfect in this world.  The imperfections 
are introduced by the assumption that borrowers/entrepreneurs can pledge no more 
than a fraction 0 < λj < 1 of the project-j revenue for the repayment.15  This 
condition can be stated as: 
(BC-j):  )()(' bjjjj mrkfmR   , 
where (BC-j) stands for Borrowing Constraint for a Type-j.  The fraction, λj, 
represents the financial friction for investing into a Type-j project, and treated as 
given by each agent.  We will later describe how this depends on the country’s IQ. 
By combining (PC-j) and (BC-j), we may define the maximal rate of return 
that an entrepreneur could credibly offer to the lender by running a type-j project 
as follows: 
(PC-j)+(BC-j):    )('/)(,1 kfmmMax
R
r
jj
b
j
j
j 
 . 
Since each entrepreneur would prefer obtaining the credit at a rate satisfying 
)(' kfRr jj  than not obtaining the credit at all, and since each of them has access 
to any project type-j  J, bidding among entrepreneurs ensures that the credit goes 
only to the projects with the highest rj in equilibrium, so that 
      )('/)(,1 kfmmMax
R
MaxrMaxr
jj
b
j
j
JjjJj 









 
. 
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Note that the ranking of projects may depend on  
Jjjjj
mR

;; , but not on k nor  
r.  This means that only one type of projects is funded by the credit market.16  By 
denoting such a project-type by  jJj rArgj  max* ,  
   jJj rMaxr    














L
IR
f
mmMax
R j
jj
b
j
j *
***
* '
/)(,1 
,  
where I is the aggregate investment, i.e., the total amount of the endowment left 
unconsumed and allocated to the investment projects in t = 0, which are 
transformed into capital in t = 1, at the rate equal to *jR , because 
IRmImRK jjjj **** )/)((  .
17 
In what follows, we focus on the case where (BC-j) is more stringent than 
(PC-j) for all j , which can be achieved by setting ωb = 0.18    Then, (BC-j*) is 
binding in equilibrium, and the above expression is simplified to:  
 jJj rMaxr     kfRMax jj '  kfR jj ')( **  = 




L
IR
fR jjj
*
** ')( . 
In words, the credit goes to the projects that generate the highest pledgeable rate 
of return.19  This expression can be inverted to obtain the Aggregate Investment 
Schedule, which is decreasing in r: 
(1)   








 
** *
1')(
jjj
R
rf
R
LrI

       I < 0. 
Since the Aggregate Saving Schedule is an increasing function of r, 
(2)   LrVErS b )(')( 1   =   LrV )(' 1 ,   S > 0 
the Current Account Schedule, the difference between the aggregate saving and 
investment, is also increasing in r: 
(3) )()()( rIrSrCA  =    
















 
** *
11 '1)('
jjj R
rf
R
rVL

 . CA >0 
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These schedules are illustrated by Figure 1, the Metzler diagram.  If a country were 
in autarky, its domestic market rate of return would adjust to equate its aggregate 
saving and the aggregate investment, so that  
0)()()(  AAA rIrSrCA , 
where rA is the country’s autarky market rate of return, given at the intersection of 
its aggregate saving and investment schedule.20 
Instead, imagine that this country can lend and borrow at the rate r = r*, 
determined at the world financial market.  More specifically, suppose that period-0 
endowment is (intertemporally) tradeable at the price r* for a unit of period-1 
consumption good, while the capital stock generated by the project and labor are 
not tradeable.   Then, if rA < r* , as depicted in Figure 1, this country runs a current 
account surplus (i.e., capital outflow) in t = 0.21 If rA > r* , this country runs a 
current account deficit (i.e.. capital inflow) in t = 0.  What is important here is that 
)(rCA  is strictly increasing in r; it is not crucial for )(rS to be increasing in r.  All 
we need is that a higher r does not reduce the domestic saving as fast as the 
domestic investment. 
 To determine r*, let us suppose that saving can flow freely across borders 
to equate the rates of return everywhere.  Since the world as a whole is a closed 
economy, the equilibrium rate of return is given by the condition: 



Cc
c
Cc
c rIrS *)(*)(     0*)( 
Cc
c rCA , 
where superscript c  C, the country index, is now made explicit.  Recall that 
)()()( rIrSrCA ccc   is strictly increasing in r.  Thus, the autarky rates of 
returns,   CccAr  , dictate “chains of comparative advantage” in intertemporal trade, 
i.e., the patterns of capital flows.  If we list all countries from the left to the right in 
the increasing order of their autarky rates of return, CAAA rrr  ...21 , we can 
draw a line somewhere in the middle such that all the countries on the left side of 
the line experience current account surpluses and all the countries on the right side 
experience current account deficits, and that there must be at least one country on 
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each side of the line.  In particular, if C = 2, the country with the higher autarky 
rate runs a surplus (or capital outflow) and the other country runs a deficit (i.e., 
capital inflow). 
 
3. Patterns of Capital Flows with Exogenous Productivity and IQ 
First, let us consider the case where there is one type of the project, hence 
IQ cannot possibly affect the composition of credit, and hence productivity of 
projects funded.   By dropping the project index, j, the aggregate investment 
schedule, eq.(1), becomes simply:  
(4)   




 
R
rf
R
LrI

1')( ,       I < 0. 
In this setup, there is no need to disentangle pledegeability from IQ; the effect of a 
better IQ can be captured by a higher λ, which unambiguously shifts the investment 
schedule to the right in Figure 1, which leads to a higher rA.  Hence, if countries 
differ only in IQ, those with better IQs become richer (measured in the wage and 
per capita income) and run current account deficits (i.e., capital inflows), while 
those with worse IQs are poorer and run current account surpluses (i.e, capital 
outflows), generating the reverse patterns of capital flows.22 
In contrast, productivity parameter, R, appears twice in Eq. (4).  The 
aggregate investment is decreasing in the first R, while increasing in the second R.   
They capture the two effects of (exogenously) higher productivity.  On one hand, 
more output can be produced with less investment.  On the other hand, the higher 
rate of return makes the lenders willing to finance more investment.  Simple 
algebra shows 1)(/1)log(/)log(  kRdId  , where )(k  ≡ )('/)(" kfkkf  > 0.  
Higher productivity thus leads to a higher investment iff 1)( k , the condition 
satisfied, for example, for the Cobb-Douglas case, )()( kAkf   since 
 1)(k .  In what follows, we will focus on the case where this condition 
holds.  Then, a higher R shifts the investment schedule to the right in Figure 1, 
leading to a higher rA.  Thus, if countries differ only in exogenous productivity, 
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those with higher Rs are richer (measured in the wage and per capita income) and 
run current account deficits (i.e., capital inflows), while those with lower Rs are 
poorer and run current account surpluses (i.e, capital outflows), generating the 
reverse patterns of capital flows. 
 
4. Modeling Endogenous Response of Productivity to Institutional Quality 
Let us now go back to the world where entrepreneurs have access to 
heterogeneous investment projects.  As stated, projects differ both in productivity 
and in pledgeability.  Without further loss of generality, we may also assume that 
projects with higher productivity come with lower pledgeability.23  We now impose 
more structures to introduce institution-dependent productivity-agency cost trade-
off. 
More concretely, let pledgeability of project j in country c be decomposed 
into two components, as follows: 
(5) 
c
j
c
j R
 )]([ . 
First, 1)(0  jR  is the project-specific component, which is common across 
countries.  It represents the agency problem associated with each project-type, and 
)(  is strictly decreasing, which captures the trade-offs between productivity and 
the agency problem.  Second, θc > 0 is the country-specific component, which 
represents the degree of credit market imperfections in country c, thus the 
(inverse) measure of its IQ.  With 1)(0  jR , a bigger θ makes pledgeability 
smaller, exacerbating the agency problem.  Furthermore, as the credit market 
becomes perfect, θc  0, cj  1 for all j, so that all projects become fully 
pledgeable, and hence the credit would go to the most productive projects.  Note 
that the assumed functional form satisfies the property of strict log-submodularity 
in R and θ.24  In words, a more productive project, with its bigger agency problem, 
suffers disproportionately more in a country with a bigger institutional problem. 
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 Under this specification, the country’s IQ affects productivity of projects 
funded.  To see why, recall that the credit goes to the projects that generate the 
highest pledgeable rate of return.  In other words, the market solves,  
 jjRjjJj RRR j
 )]([max}{max 

. 
Figure 2 illustrates this maximization problem.  As IQ deteriorates (a bigger θ), the 
graph,  )]([ jj R , shifts down.  Furthermore, with strict log-submodularity, this 
negative effect is disproportionately larger for more productive projects with 
bigger agency problems, which is illustrated by a tilting movement of the graph.  
As a result, the credit shifts towards less productive projects with smaller agency 
problems.  In other words, the solution, R(θ), is decreasing in θ.25 
By inserting R(θ), the aggregate investment schedule, eq. (1), can be now 
rewritten as: 
(6)  
  







 
)())((
'
)(
);( 1

  RR
rf
R
LrI . 
Note that R(θ) appears three times in the equation.  An increase in the first R(θ) 
reduces the investment.  This effect, i.e., less investment is needed to produce 
more output, is of the first-order.  In contrast, the remaining effects are of the 
second-order, because a change in the second R(θ) and a change in the third R(θ) 
offsets each other.  This is because R(θ) is chosen to maximize RR )]([ .  When 
R(θ) changes due to a change in θ, it is because the composition of credit shifts 
towards projects that are not only more productive but also subject to bigger 
agency problems.  As a result, it has negligible effects on the pledgeable rate of 
return, which eliminates the usual effect of making the lenders willing to finance 
more investment.  This is nothing but the envelope theorem.  The credit market 
always selects the best project for the lenders under the institutional constraint.  
Hence, an improvement in IQ has only negligible effects on the lenders.  For this 
reason, an increase in R(θ) through a change in θ reduces the investment, unlike an 
exogenous increase in R.26 
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 The above paragraph is concerned with the indirect effect of IQ on the 
investment through its effect on productivity.  In addition, there is the direct effect 
of improving IQ (a lower θ), which increases the investment.  The combined effect 
on the investment is generally ambiguous, so we need to look at some specific 
examples.  In contrast, improving IQ (a lower θ) unambiguously increases R(θ)I(r, 
θ), and hence the country’s wage and per capita income.27 
 
5. Patterns of International Capital Flows with Endogenous Productivity 
 We now look at several examples to understand how exogenous IQ 
differences across countries shape the patterns of international capital flows, when 
IQ differences also cause productivity differences.  
5.1. A Two-Project Case:   
First, let us consider the case with two projects, J = {0,1}, with R0 < R1 
and 00 )(1  R  > 11)(  R .  Thus, a type-1 project is more productive than 
a type-0 project, but it is more subject to the agency problem.  Hence, the 
pledgeable rate of return declines faster for type-1 projects than for type-0 projects 
when IQ deteriorates (a bigger θ), as shown in Figure 3a.    Only type-0 projects 
are financed when  ˆ  and only type-1 projects are financed when  ˆ  , where 
the switch occurs at )/log(/)/log(ˆ 1001  RR .  Figure 3b shows )(R .  Note 
that productivity, )(R ,  jumps at  ˆ , but the pledgeable rate of return, 
  )()((   RR , changes smoothly  at  ˆ .  Thus, when productivity changes as 
 crosses ˆ , the first effect of productivity improvement, --less investment is 
needed to produce more output--, dominates the second effect,--lenders are willing 
to finance more investment.   Hence, the investment schedule shifts to the left, 
when productivity increases at  ˆ .  With the fixed upward-sloping saving 
schedule, this translates into a nonmonotone response of rA to a change in  , as 
depicted in Figure 3c.28 
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5.1.1: A Two-Country World  
Now suppose that there are two countries, C = {N, S},  where N stands for 
the rich North and S for the poor South, with θN < θS.  Let us assume that the two 
countries are identical in all other dimensions.  
Figure 4a depicts the case of θN < θS < ˆ .  This means that rAN > rAS, which 
implies CAN < 0 < CAS.  Thus, capital flows from S to N.  In this case, both 
countries use the same technologies, but N’s superior institution causes the reverse 
flows, because the interest of lenders is better protected in N than in S. 
Figure 4b depicts the case of θN < ~ < ˆ  < θS .   Again, rAN > rAS, which 
implies CAN < 0 < CAS.  Thus, capital flows from S to N.   In this case, countries 
differ both in productivity and in institutional quality.  However, the institutional 
quality difference is the cause for the reverse flows.  Although N is more 
productive than S, it is false to attribute the reverse capital flows to the 
productivity difference.  Indeed, in this case, endogenous response of productivity 
partially offsets the effect of institutional difference on the capital flows. 
Figure 4c depicts the case of ~ < θN <ˆ  < θS .  This means that rAN < rAS, 
which implies CAN > 0 > CAS.  Hence, capital flows from N to S.  However, the 
logic behind these capital flows from the rich to the poor is quite different from the 
standard neoclassical logic.  In this case, S is less productive due to its inferior 
institution, and hence it needs to borrow from abroad.  Thus, the causality runs 
from the underdevelopment to foreign borrowing.  It is false to interpret this case 
as showing that “foreign capital” somehow undermines South’s development.29 
 Now, imagine that, starting from the case depicted in Figure 4c, S manages 
to improve its institution and succeed improving its productivity, but does not 
catch up with N.  This thought experiment is illustrated in Figure 4d.  Capital flows 
are reversed.  S’s current account turns from a deficit to a surplus.  (That is, capital 
starts flowing out, instead of flowing in.)  This illustrates one scenario in which a 
poor country can experience both a rapid growth and a capital outflow after the 
reform. 
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5.1.2: A Three-Country World:  
Now suppose that there are three countries, C = {N, M, S}, with θN < θM < 
θS.  Again, assume that these countries are identical in all other dimensions.  
 Figure 5a depicts the case of  θN<~ < θM<ˆ < θS .  This means that rAN < 
rAS < rAM, which implies CAN < 0 < CAM, so that capital flows into N, and out of 
M, hence reverse flows between N and M.  Furthermore, among developing 
countries, capital flows from the more successful M to the less successful S, which 
is reminiscent of the allocation puzzle. 
Figure 5b depicts the case of ~ <θN<ˆ < θM < θS.  This means that rAN < 
rAS = rAM, which implies that CAN > 0 > CAM, CAS, so that capital flows from N to 
M and S.  This is because (and not despite that) the most developed N  has higher 
productivity than M or S. 
Figure 5c depicts the case of ~ < θN <θM<ˆ < θS .  This implies that capital 
flows into S and out of M.   Again, among developing countries, capital flows from 
the more successful to the less successful among developing countries, because 
(and not despite that) the more successful is more productive. 
 Now, consider the thought experiment, in which some developing 
countries, represented by M, succeeded in improving their institutions, while other 
developing countries, represented by  S, are left behind.  This is illustrated by 
Figure 5d, which shows that M’s current account turns from a deficit to a surplus 
(capital starts flowing out, instead of flowing in).  Thus, M experiences both a 
rapid growth and a capital outflow after the reform.  Furthermore, N’s current 
account could turn from a surplus to a deficit as a result of M’s growth.  
 
5.2.  A Continuum of Projects Case 
One might think that the U-shaped patterns obtained above may be driven 
by the two features of the set of available technologies assumed, J = {0,1}.  First, 
its discrete nature means that the autarky rate of return jumps when the switch 
occurs.  Second, its finiteness means the presence of the most productive 
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technology, type-1, so that, once a country’s IQ becomes sufficient good, a further 
improvement in IQ could not improve productivity.   To show that the U-shaped 
patterns can arise more generally, this subsection presents the case of a continuum 
of available projects with no upper-bound on productivity. 
More concretely, suppose Rj  [R0,∞) for j  J = [0,∞), with  
















 0
11exp)(
R
R
R jj  with γ > 0. 
Note that )( 0R  = 1; 0 < )( jR  < 1 for Rj > R0 and )( jR  is decreasing in Rj. 
This captures the trade-off between productivity and the agency problem.   
The market selects the project the generates the highest pledgeable rate of 
return, i.e., the project that solves jjjj RRMaxRMax
 )]([}{  .  Thus,   
 /10 /)( RR  with )())](([ 
 RR =     /1)1(0 /eR  for 0 < θ < 1, 
both of which are decreasing in θ.   Thus, as the IQ deteriorates, the credit shifts 
towards less productive projects and the lenders obtain a lower rate of return.   
Furthermore,  )(lim 0  R , so that productivity continues to improve as IQ 
improves.  In contrast,  
)(R = R0  with )())](([   RR  = R0  for θ ≥ 1,  
so that the credit goes to the least productive but fully pledgeable project. 
Inserting the above expressions to 
   r
L
IRfRR 





)(')()(   , 
and differentiating with respect to θ yield: 





 




111log
d
Id ,   where 
)('
)(")(
kf
kkfk  , for 0 < θ < 1. 
If η(k)  > 1, I(r;θ) and hence rA are increasing in θ.  In this case, capital flows from 
the rich to the poor, simply because the more efficient rich needs less investment.  
This is not an interesting case, as it has nothing to do with the endogeneity of 
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productivity.  If η(k) < 1, I(r;θ) and hence rA are increasing in θ > 1– η(k), and 
decreasing in θ < 1– η(k). 
 To obtain a closed form solution, consider the Cobb-Douglas case, 
  Akkf  , so that η(k) is constant and η = 1 – α < 1.  Then, the investment 
schedule is given by );(log rI  log1)(  r  for θ < 1, and = )(r for θ 
> 1, where )(r is independent of θ.   Note that 
 I(r;θ) is decreasing in θ < α and increasing in α < θ < 1. 
 I(r;θ) > I(r;1) if θ < ~ and I(r;θ) < I(r;1) if ~ < θ < 1, where 1~   is the 
second solution to 0log1)(  h , and satisfies   ~0 . 
With the fixed upward-sloping saving schedule, this translates into U-shaped 
patterns of the (autarky) rate of return, as shown in Figure 6.  Therefore, all the 
patterns of capital flows described for the two-projects case in the previous section 
can also occur for this case, where R(θ) is unbounded and responds smoothly to θ. 
 
6. Alternative Interpretations 
6.1  A One-Sector Interpretation 
Up to now, the model has been given a two-sector interpretation.  That is, 
the entrepreneurs run projects that produce tangible “physical capital,” in the 
capital goods sector, which is rented out to the consumption goods sector.  Taken 
literally, this means that IQ affects the investment and capital flows through its 
impacts of the productivity of capital goods sector.  This is consistent with the 
empirical evidence suggesting that the relative prices of capital goods to 
consumption goods are higher among less developed countries.30  Nevertheless, it 
is not an essential element of the argument, and the mechanism does not rely on 
the two-sector structure.  To show this, this subsection offers a one-sector 
interpretation of the model. 
Imagine that the economy produces the single consumption good, using the 
endowment and labor.  In t = 0, entrepreneurs may invest mj units of the 
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endowment to set up a type-j firm.  A type-j firm produces the consumption good 
in t = 1, using the labor input, n, with a concave production function, )(ny jj  .  
Each firm hires labor in the competitive labor market at the wage rate, w,  so that 
its employment would be determined by wn jj )(' .  Hence, the profit that could 
be earned from running a type-j firm is })(max{ wnnjj    = 
jjjjj nnn )(')(   . 
 Suppose that nnmRfnmRFn jjjjj )/(),()(  , where Rj is a parameter.  
Then, for a given wage rate, w, the employment and the profit by a type-j firm can 
be written as kmRn jjj /  and )(')( kfmR jjj  , where k is defined uniquely for 
each w by )(')( kkfkfw  .  If a type-j firm can pledge up to λj fraction of its 
profit, the pledgeable rate of return for lending to type-j firms would be jjj m/  
= )(' kfR jj , so that the credit flows only to those firms with the highest λjRj.  By 
denoting such firms by }{max* jjJj RArgj  ,  the equilibrium rate of return 
earned by the lenders is  
)('** kfRr jj .   
Since each active firm hires nj* = Rj*mj*/k, summing up across all firms yield the 
labor market equilibrium condition,  
kIRkmRnL jjjj // ****   ,  
where I is the aggregate investment.  By combining these expressions, we obtain 
  LIRfRkfRr jjjjj /')(' *****   ,  
from which eq.(1) and hence eq.(4) and eq.(6) will also follow.  This alternative 
interpretation thus gives the same predictions on the relationship between IQ, the 
investment and capital flows. 
According to this interpretation, there is no separate investment good 
sector.  Investment is an productivity-enhancing expenditure of the consumption 
goods sector; Rj* = R(θ) is the realized productivity parameter in the consumption 
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good sector; and k represents the organizational (i.e., intangible) capital per 
worker, embodied in the firms that set up by entrepreneurs.  The assumption of 
nontradeability of k might be more natural under this interpretation.  Furthermore, 
for f(k) = Akα, AR(θ)α may be viewed as the TFP of the consumption goods sector 
firms.31 
 
6.2 An Infinite Period Interpretation in an OLG framework 
Some readers may find the two-period setup developed above too 
restrictive, because each country’s intertemporal trade must be in balance due to 
the Walras’ Law, so that  CA0 = CA(r) > 0 in t = 0 implies CA1 = ‒CA(r) < 0 in t = 
1.  Thus, taken literally, any country experiencing a capital outflow today will 
experience a capital inflow in the future.  However, the above setup can be given 
an infinite-period interpretation by embedding the structure into an overlapping 
generations framework.32 
 Imagine now that there is an infinite number of periods, extending from t = 
0, 1, 2, ….   In period t, a continuum of savers/workers, with their total 
endowment ωLt and total labor supply Lt, and a continuum of entrepreneurs of 
mass Et are born and live for two periods.  Those born in the same period interact 
with each other just as described above.  Thus, the savers/workers born in period-t 
finance the projects run by the entrepreneurs born in period-t, and the 
savers/workers born in period-t work with capital generated by the projects in their 
second period (period t+1).  In this setup, there is no interaction across different 
generations.  This means that, from the intertemporal budget constraint of each 
agent, the current account of generation born in period-t (generation-t) in period 
t+1 must be equal to the negative of the current account of this generation-t in 
period t.  
 Consider a particular country whose IQ is given by θ.   Then, the 
investment in period t is 
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which differs from eq.(6) only in that Lt may vary over time.  Likewise, the saving 
by generation-t in period t can be written as: 
   )()(' 111   tttttt rSLrVLS  , 
so that the current account by generation-t in period t can be written as: 
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Since the current account by generation-(t‒1) in period t must be equal to the 
negative of the current account by this generation in period-(t‒1), 
);(1
1 tt
t
t rCALCA 
  , 
the current account of this country in period t is equal to: 
);();( 11
1  
  tttt
t
t
t
tt rCALrCALCACACA . 
Suppose 1)1(  tt LgL , where g > 0 is a constant rate of population (or 
Harrod-neutral productivity) growth, which is common across all countries.  Then, 
in per capita term, this country’s current account is: 
  );()1();( 1
1
 

 tt
t
t
t rCAgrCAL
CAca . 
 In this environment, the autarky equilibrium path of this country is 
characterized by a constant autarky rate of return, At rr  given by 
0);(  At rgCAca .  If this country has access to the world financial market 
where it could lend or borrow at *rrt  , 
0)*;(  rgCAcat  if 
Arr * ; 0)*;(  rgCAcat  if 
Arr * . 
Thus, the country experiences a current surplus (deficit) and capital outflows 
(inflows) if its autarky rate is lower (higher) than the world rate, each period.  This 
way, all of the results on the effects of IQ differences discussed in the two-period 
setup can be restated in an infinite period setup. 
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7. Concluding Remarks 
 This paper proposes a stylized model of the world economy to study 
theoretically how the cross-country differences in the institutional quality (IQ) of 
the domestic credit markets shape the patterns of international capital flows when 
such IQ differences also cause productivity differences across countries.  
Institution affects productivity by changing the composition of credit across 
heterogeneous investment projects with different productivity.  Such institution-
induced productivity differences are shown to have effects on the investment and 
capital flows that are opposite of productivity differences due to other factors.  
This implies that the overall effect of IQ could generate U-shaped responses of the 
investment and capital flows, which means, among other things, that there is no 
reason to expect capital inflows when a country is more productive and has better 
institution protecting the interest of lenders, even if saving flows freely across 
borders to equalize the rates of return; that capital flows out from middle-income 
countries and flows into both low-income and high-income countries, and that, 
starting from a very low IQ, a country could experience both a growth and a 
current account surplus after a successful institutional reform.  These results 
should provide some cautions when interpreting the empirical evidence on the role 
of productivity differences and institutional differences on capital flows.  It 
suggests the need to separate institution-induced productivity differences from 
other sources of productivity differences.   It also suggests that it might be 
misleading to proxy the quality of financial institutions, which is an exogenous 
characteristic of countries in the model, by any measure of financial frictions, 
which are endogenously determined.  More generally, they call into question the 
usefulness of the standard dichotomy, “productivity differences” and “credit 
market imperfections,” often used in the literature of international capital flows.  In 
addition, several features of the model, such as poor IQ preventing productive 
technologies from being adopted, institutional changes causing productivity 
change, countries with faster productivity growth having lower rates of return (in a 
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closed economy), etc., might have wider applications outside of the patterns of 
capital flows. 
 Obviously, the model can be extended in many different directions.  Let me 
just discuss one of them, instead of trying to provide an exhaustive list.  In the 
above model, IQ differences cause productivity differences across countries.  In 
reality, the causality should run in both directions; the difference in the quality of 
domestic credit markets may be at least in part due to the differences in 
productivity or more generally in the level of development.  Such reverse causality 
from productivity to IQ may be modeled, for example, by introducing the 
governments which choose how much to invest to improve the credit market 
institutions or even simply decide how much to enforce the payment to the 
lenders.33  It would be interesting to investigate how such a two-way causality 
between productivity and IQ affect the patterns of capital flows.  The model 
developed here should serve as a useful building block for that purpose. 
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Figure 1: Metzler Diagram 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Endogenous Productivity Response to Institutional Quality Change 
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Figure 3: A Two-Project Case 
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Figure 4: A Two-Country World 
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Figure 5: A Three-Country World 
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Figure 6: A Continuum of Projects Case 
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Endnotes: 
                                                                            
1 See, for example, Gourinchas and Jeanne (2009) and Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian (2007). 
2For example, they seem to have this intuition when Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008, 
Footnote 7) argued that, although output and growth are assumed to be exogenous in their model, 
allowing limited financial commitment to affect output and growth would exacerbate their 
results. 
3 To economize language, we simply say “exogenous productivity differences” to mean 
productivity differences caused by factors unrelated to (i.e., “exogenous to”) the institutional 
quality of domestic credit markets, which also include endogenous productivity differences due to 
other factors, such as human capital externalities discussed by Lucas (1990) and others. 
4 Thus, unlike Aoki, Benigno and Kiyotaki (2009) and Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001), no 
international financial market imperfection is present in this model.  A country’s poor IQ reduces 
the rate of return to lending to its entrepreneurs, regardless of the nationality of lenders.  All 
lenders from all countries earn the same rate of return.  See Caselli and Feyrer (2007) for the 
evidence in support of this.  Besides, adding barriers to international capital flows into models 
could reduce the volume, but could not change the sign of net asset positions of countries, as 
pointed out by Gourinchas and Jeanne (2009). 
5The alert reader might notice that this is an application of the envelope theorem, as will be 
shown more formally later.  The market always selects the project that maximizes the rate of 
return to the lender, holding IQ constant.  When an improvement in IQ changes the project 
selection by relaxing the borrowing constraint, the effect on productivity is of the first-order, but 
the effect on the rate of return to the lender is of the second-order. 
6One interpretation for the negative correlation between foreign capital inflows and growth 
among low-income countries, suggested by Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian (2007), and Prasad 
and Rajan (2008), is that the costs of inflows of foreign capital would exceed the benefits among 
countries below a certain threshold level of institutional development, due to a real exchange rate 
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overvaluation and the resulting loss of competitiveness.  My model suggests a reverse causality, 
from poor institution to low productivity and then to foreign capital inflows. 
7 For example, Acemoglu (2008, Chapter 19.2) organizes his discussion on capital flows along 
this dichotomy, by following the development of the literature, while questioning the validity of 
this dichotomy at the same time. 
8As noted in Footnote 4, this is different from assuming frictions in international financial 
markets, although the existing empirical studies on capital flows pays little attention to this 
distinction.  
9Strictly speaking, reverse flows in the Caballero-Farhi-Gourinchas model occurs because some 
countries have a limited supply of saving vehicles.  However, they suggested that this could be 
attributed to the country’s institutional problem.  In the Ju-Wei model, the presence of FDI, 
which could bypass the institutional problem, may further amplify the reverse flows of financial 
capital.  In all these models, including Sakuragawa-Hamada and my previous models on capital 
flows, a conceptual distinction between the financial friction and the IQ is not necessary, as the 
IQ would not change the composition of credit across projects with different degrees of agency 
problems.  Such a distinction is crucial for understanding the mechanism in this paper. 
10Also relevant are the empirical findings of Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Caselli and Feyrer 
(2007) that financial development shifts the sectoral composition toward more capital intensive; 
and Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011), Caselli and Feyrer (2007), Greenwood, Hercowitz, and 
Krusell (2000), and Hsieh and Klenow (2007) that the relative prices of capital goods to 
consumption goods are higher among less developed countries.  To explain this, Buera, Kaboski 
and Shin (2011) constructed a two-sector model in which productivity responds endogenously to 
IQ by affecting the sectoral composition. 
11Through a quite different mechanism, Aoki, Benigno and Kiyotaki (2009) generates non-
monotonic patterns of the autarky interest rate and of capital flows in a small open economy 
model, where the entrepreneurs could pledge a fraction of future output to the domestic lender, 
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while they could pledge none of future output to the foreign lender.  Investment productivity is an 
exogenous characteristic of entrepreneurs.  Non-monotonicity occurs because low productive 
entrepreneurs could attract credit along with high productive ones when and only when the 
pledgeable issue among the domestic agents is severe enough.  They interpret higher 
pledgeability among domestic agents as an improvement in the country’s institutional quality, 
even though it would put the foreign lender at greater disadvantage, thereby adding more 
international distortions. 
12Of course, it is important that the reform reduces but does not eliminate the credit market 
imperfections for this to be true.  As stressed in Matsuyama (2008), credit market imperfections 
have generally non-monotonic effects, so that one should not study the effects of improving the 
credit market by making a binary comparison between a model with the perfect credit market and 
a model without.  
13 The two assumptions are responsible for this feature.  First, the quasi-linearity ensures that all 
the income effect is entirely absorbed by period-1 consumption.  (In addition, the quasi-linearity 
rules out the possibility of a backward-bending saving schedule.)  Second, the wage income is not 
earned in t = 0.  Considering that t = 1 should be interpreted to include all future periods, these 
assumptions are not so unreasonable.  However, they are not necessary to make the saving 
schedule independent of the wage rate.  Alternatively, this can be achieved, for example, by 
separating the identity of the savers and the workers, and assuming that the workers do not save.  
14 Although we assume, for simplicity, the scale of investment mj as a fixed parameter, it should 
become clear later that entrepreneurs would not gain even if they were allowed to invest less than 
mj.  What is crucial is that they face the upper-bound, mj, and cannot invest by infinite amount.  
See Footnote 19 for more detail. 
15 See Tirole (2005) for the pledegeability approach for modeling credit market imperfections, 
and see Matsuyama (2008) for a variety of applications in macroeconomics.  Although various 
stories of agency problems can be told to justify the assumption that only a fraction is pledgeable, 
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its main appeal is the simplicity, which makes it suitable for studying general equilibrium 
implications of credit market imperfections. 
16This means that, when the composition of credit changes, it switches from one type to another 
completely.  (In the case of a tie, the entrepreneurs would pick the project type that is more 
productive.)  This “bang-bang” nature of compositional changes, while not a realistic feature of 
the model, makes the analysis highly tractable. 
17 Given that each entrepreneur face the upper-bound, mj*, it is necessary to assume that there are 
sufficiently many entrepreneurs, */ jmIE  , to ensure the interior solution for I.  This is the only 
role that the parameter E plays in the model. 
18 In addition, setting ωb = 0 for all countries eliminates the reverse capital flows mechanism that 
operate through the cross-country differences in the borrower net worth, already studied by 
Gertler and Rogoff (1991) and Matsuyama (2004, 2005) and others.  (Taken literally, ωb = 0 
would also imply that the entrepreneurs who are denied credit would have zero consumption.  
However, this implication can easily be removed by giving them some non-storable endowments 
that can be consumed but cannot be used in the investment, without affecting any of the analysis.) 
19 Since    kfRkfRr jjj '')( ***   , (PC-j*) holds with strict inequality, which has two 
implications.  First, the equilibrium allocation of the credit necessarily involves credit rationing.  
With entrepreneurs being homogeneous, the credit is allocated randomly to a fraction of the 
enterpreneurs, while the rest are denied credit.  The latter would not be able to entice lenders by 
promising a higher rate of return, because that would violate (BC-j*).  For more discussion on 
this feature of the model, see Matsuyama (2008, Remark 3).  Second, the entrepreneurs would 
have an incentive to invest more if they had access to a linear technology.  This is the reason for 
introducing diminishing returns in investment technologies in the form of an upper-bound.  On 
the other hand, entrepreneurs would not gain from investing project-j less than mj.  The 
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indivisibility assumption can thus be dropped without changing the results, except that the credit 
rationing now take the form of not every entrepreneur being able to invest up to mj.   
20 Note that rA is independent of L, a feature that turns out to be convenient later in Section 6.2. 
21 Recall that, in the balance-of-payment accounting, a surplus in the current account, 
)()()( rIrSrCA ccc   > 0 is a deficit in the financial account (used to be called the “capital 
account”), )()()( rSrIrFA ccc  < 0, and hence a capital outflow. 
22This result has already been reported in Matsuyama (2008, sec.6). 
23It is without loss of generality, because within the set of all feasible projects, the entrepreneurs 
would always choose a project on the frontier where both R and λ cannot be increased.  Hence, 
the analysis may be restricted to the frontier of the feasibility set, along which R and λ are 
negatively related.  In this section, we are assuming that two or more projects are on the frontier.  
Otherwise, the credit would always flow into the most productive project, effectively bringing the 
model back to the homogeneous project case discussed in the previous section.  
24 See Topkis (1998) for mathematics of super- and sub-modularity and Costinot (2009) for a 
recent application to international economics.  More generally, 1);(~  cj
c
j R   is strictly log-
submodular in R and θ iff  R/~log2  < 0 (for a twice-differentiable case).  The assumed 
functional form in (5) is not crucial, as long as it satisfies strict log-submodularity.  Nevertheless, 
eq. (5) is algebraically simple and more convenient because it can be decomposed into the 
project-specific and country-specific components to discuss them separately.   
25 With a continuum of projects with the range of Rj being an interval, as in the case studied in 
Section 5.2, this can also be shown for a more general smooth function, 1);(~  cj
c
j R   as 
follows.  As RRR log);(~log);(    is maximized at R = R(θ), 0));((  RR  and 
0));((  RRR .  Thus, whenever R(θ) is differentiable, applying the implicit function theorem 
yields ));((/));(()('   RRR RRR  , and hence )('sgn R = ));((sgn  RR  = 
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 R/~logsgn 2  < 0. (Note: this demonstration requires no assumption on the sign of 
);( RR .) 
26It is worth noting that the statement, an increase in R(θ) through a change in θ reduces the 
investment, is quite general.  It does not depend on J , )( , nor )(f .  Nor does it depend on 
the assumption of strict log-submodularity, which only plays a role in determining how R(θ) 
depends on θ. 
27 To see this, for a fixed   )(')())(( kfRRr   , a lower θ increases   )())((   RR and hence 
k = R(θ)I/L, y = f(k), and w = f(k) ‒ kfˊ(k). 
28Figure 3c is drawn for Λ0 = 1, which implies that the graph is flat for  ˆ .  For Λ0 < 1, the 
graph would have a negative slope after it jumps upward at  ˆ .  The assumption, )(k  < 1, 
ensures that the graph starts at 0 above the dotted line, and cross the dotted line at 
 ˆ~  .  If )(k > 1, the graph could stay below the dotted line for all  ˆ . 
29 A common interpretation in the empirical literature seems that inflows of foreign capital would 
cause a real exchange appreciation, which leads to the loss of competitiveness of the industries.  
30 See, for example, Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011), Caselli and Feyrer (2007), Greenwood, 
Hercowitz and Krusell (2000),  and Hsieh and Klenow (2007). 
31 Uzawa (1969) is among the first to formulate capital as a productivity index in the production 
function, with the investment being interpreted as any productivity-shifting expenditure, which 
includes but is not limited to manufacturing or purchasing capital goods.  He attributed the idea 
to Penrose (1959).   
32 See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, Ch.2) for a survey on overlapping generations models of the 
current account.  
33 One might think that, once we allow for the possibility that the governments cannot commit to 
enforce the payments by the domestic entrepreneurs, they would choose not to enforce only when 
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the lenders are foreigners, which might invalidate the assumption that the lenders from all 
countries earn the same rate of return.  However, as Broner and Ventura (2010, 2011) have 
recently argued, the governments may not necessarily have the means to discriminate the 
domestic and foreign lenders. 
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